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ABSTRACT
This paper adopts agent-based simulation to study the horizontal competition among homogenous price-setting retailers
in a one-to-many supply chain (one supplier and multiple retailers). We model the supplier and retailers as agents, and
design their behavioral rules respectively. The results show that although the agents learn individually based on their
own experiences, the system shows an asymptotic convergence, which approaches Nash equilibrium. Based on these
results, we discuss the effects of the retailers’ horizontal competition on the retail price, retailers’ and supplier’s profits.
Keywords: supply chain, agent-based simulation, horizontal competition, Nash equilibrium
1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of supply chain was introduced several
years ago and has been widely studied in academic
researches and industrial applications. A supply chain is
a network composed of suppliers, manufacturers,
retailers, etc., which cooperate to offer a kind of goods
or service. The partners in a supply chain cooperate to
gain extra profits and also compete for more profits.
These cooperations and competitions, along with the
various uncertainties, make the research on supply chain
a quite complex and difficult task. [1] shows that in the
academic study of supply chain, only some relatively
simple issues are discussed, and many assumptions and
constraints are imposed to these models.
Besides analytical methods, simulation is also an
important research methodology. Compared with
analytical methods, it is more suitable to study complex
issues. Simulation has been widely applied in various
engineering fields, and recently some social scientists
have tried it in social science research and have got
valuable results. The most prominent research in this
direction is experimental economics, e.g., [2], [3] and
[4].
There are also researches that use simulation to study
management issues. For example, discrete event
simulation [5] has a relatively long history in operations
research. But such simulations are focused on the
sequence and/or causal relationships of events, which is
not suited to describe the competition and cooperation
relationships between the partners in a supply chain. On
the contrary, agent-based modeling adopts a bottom-up
approach and focuses on the design of agents’ individual
behaviors, and watches what systemic macro behaviors
evolve from individuals’ micro dynamics [6]. This is
quite suitable for modeling complex systems, such as
supply chain systems [7].

This paper adopts agent-based simulation to study
horizontal competitions in supply chains. Horizontal
competition is a hot spot and also a nodus in supply
chain research. It is generally analyzed with
non-cooperative game theory. But just as we have
mentioned before, the application of such an analytical
approach is limited into relatively simple models. [8]
studies a supply chain model with multiple retailers,
each of whom faces a newsboy decision problem. Based
on this model, [9] adopts discrete choice model to
describe the dynamic process of arrival and choice
behavior of each customer. As in [8], the retail prices are
fixed, and the retailers only determine order quantity.
We know that in many cases retail price affects
customer demand. So the model in [9] should be
extended to a more sophisticated model with multiple
competing price-setting retailers, i.e., retailers can adjust
their retail prices to influence customer demands. But
this model is almost intractable with analytical methods.
In this model, each retailer’s profit is determined not
only by his own retail price and order quantity, but also
on other retailers’. The competition becomes more
intense, and things become more interesting: how will
these price-setting retailers make their decisions? Will
the retailers find appropriate retail price and order
quantity? How will the retailers’ profits and the
supplier’s profits be? In this paper, we study such a
model and try to answer these questions through
agent-based simulation. We model each retailer and the
supplier into an agent and design learning rules for it.
The simulation results show that although the agents
learn individually based on their own experiences, each
of them finally gets a relatively stable policy, and the
whole system asymptotically converges to an absorbing
state which approaches the Nash equilibrium. Based on
these results, we also discuss how the retail price and
supplier/retailer profits are affected by the competitions
between the retailers.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
describes the model settings; Section 3 shows the
simulation results and provides detailed analysis; and
Section 4 concludes this paper.
2. MODEL SETTINGS
The basic structure of the model is shown in Figure 1.
Retailer 1

Supplier

·
·
·

Customer
Demand

Retailer n
Figure 1 Model Structure
This model runs for many periods. In each period,
retailers buy products from the supplier, and then sold
them to customers. The supplier charges a fixed
wholesale price of 1, and has infinite capacity. Every
period, each retailer decides his retail price and order
quantity. The products are perishable; all the unsold
products are disposed with salvage value 0, and all the
unsatisfied customer demands are lost. From analytical
view, in each period each retailer faces a price-setting
newsboy model. The only cost of each retailer is
purchasing cost, occurs when receiving products from
the supplier. Each retailer obtains revenue by selling
products to customers. The sequence of events of this
model is as follows: on each period, each retailer places
an order to the supplier simultaneously; then the
supplier makes enough products and sends products to
each retailer with the quantity that the retailer has
ordered; then customers arrive, choose retailers and buy
products.
2.1 Customer Behavior
In this model, we adopt the discrete choice model [10]
to represent customers’ arrival and retailer-selecting
behaviors. We assume that in each period, there is a
population of customers, whose number is a Poisson
random variable with mean 1000. The arrival of the
customers is a Poisson process, and the service time of
each customer is zero. Each customer desires only one
product. When each customer arrives, he chooses a
retailer from the series of retailers N = {1,2,..., N } to
purchase one product. Each customer associates a utility
U j with each retailer j ∈ N . In additions, there is a no
selection option, denoted j = 0 , with associated utility
U 0 , which means the utility of not purchase at all. A
customer chooses the retailer with the highest utility
among the series of retailers and buys a product from
him. For example, if MaxU j = U 2 , the customer chooses
the second retailer. But if MaxU j = U 0 , the customer
returns home without buying anything. If a customer is
not satisfied, i.e., if the retailer is out of stock, the
customer makes a choice again.
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The utility U j is decomposed into two parts: one part,
denoted u j , represents the nominal (expected) utility;
the other part, denoted ξ j , is a zero-mean random
variable representing the difference between U j and
u j . Thus, U j = u j + ξ j . Nominal utility u j is
determined by some identified factors. In this paper, we
define u j = βa j − γp j ， u 0 = βa0 , where a j is a quality
index and p j is the price for product j . β and γ
represent the sensitivities of the customer to the factors.
The noise part ξ j represents the effects of those
unidentified factors, and is often modeled as a Gumbel
random variable with distribution
P(ξ j ≤ x ) = exp(− exp(− ( x / µ ) − τ ))

with mean zero and variance µ 2π 2 / 6 (τ is the Euler’s
constant). Here, it is obvious that the retailer with higher
retail price will have less utility for a customer, and so
will be less likely to be chosen.
Different with classical utility maximization, in this
model we assume U j to be unobservable a priori, so
that an individual’s choice is uncertain. When a
customer arrives, he makes a choice based only on
knowledge of the public information of each retailer’s
price. We also assume all the customers are
homogenous, and β = γ = 1 , a j = 7.06 , a 0 = 4 ,
µ = 0.847 (the data comes from the model in [9]).
2.1 Retailer Behavior
We model each of the retailers as an adaptive agent.
Here, we first assume that each retailer has an aspiration
for more profits. No matter what policy, if it can bring
more profits, the retailer will adopt it, without
considering its social effects.
We assume that the retailers have minimal information
on the environment: they do not know each other
agent’s policies, payoffs and costs. All that one retailer
knows is its own experiences. Also a retailer can
observe other agents’ historical prices, yet we assume he
does not know to utilize this information under such a
complex environment. Each retailer continuously learns
from his own experiences, and calibrates his policies to
obtain as more profits as possible. The basic idea of
each agent’s learning mechanism is that: each agent has
an infinite set of actions. At each stage, he chooses the
action that it assesses to have the highest payoff. This
idea of learning has a standard implementation – the
Q-learning in Machine Learning [11]. In our model,
each retailer has two decision variables: retail price and
order quantity. Although these two variables are
generally all continuous, we assume only discrete values
can be chosen. We define the minimal difference
between two possible prices to be 0.1, i.e., the prices
should be 2.3, 3.4, etc. We also limit retail price into the
range (1, 6) (It can be tested that when price ≥ 6,
customers will seldom buy a product; if the price ≤ 1,
the retailer will get non-positive profit, which is not
rational.). Thus each agent has 50 possible retail prices.
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Similarly, we assume the minimal batch size of the
retailers’ orders is 5. We limit the order quantity into the
range [0, 2000]. Then each retailer has 400 order
quantity choices.
We further model each of the price and quantity
decision separately into a decision “black box”, which
uses Q-learning algorithm to adaptively find best
choices. These decision black boxes are also learning
automata in artificial intelligence [12]. When a learning
automaton adopts Q-learning algorithm, it keeps a Q
value for each action, such that Q i (a i ) represents the
expected reward that the automata i believes it will
obtain by playing action a i . In this paper, we use the
following formula to update the Q value of each
action:
Q i (a ti+1 ) = Q i (a ti ) + α (r i (a t1 ,..., a tn ) − Q i (a ti ))
(1)
i
t

Here, a means the action that the agent i has
chosen at time t . For the actions that the agent did not
choose, the Q value does not change. r i ( a t1 ,..., a tn ) is
the payoff the agent gets after time t , α is step size.
Each automaton adopts softmax policy to choose
actions based on their Q values. At beginning, each
action’s initial Q value is set randomly. The readers
can refer to [11] for a detailed discussion on Q-learning
algorithm.

3. SIMULATION RESULTS
We discuss the simulation results in two steps:
convergence and insights.
3.1 Convergence
Figure 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 presents the time series of the
retailers’ moving average profits (time span is 20) when
the numbers of retailers are 1, 2, 5, 10, and 20. The
horizontal axis represents time, which is denoted with
the number of time grains (There are only three
numbers, 20000, 40000 and 60000. They are the time
represented by time grain number. In this simulation,
one period consists 8 time grains) and the vertical axis
represents retailers’ moving average profits.
1000
800
600
20000

40000

60000

Figure 2 Time series moving average profits with 1 player
600
400
200
20000

40000

60000

Figure 3 Time series moving average profits with 2 players

Here we will make a further assumption on the decision
behavior of each agent: each agent believes that it faces
an environment with rather high uncertainty; it does not
know when the game will be over, and it knows that it is
hard to make predictions. So it does not take into
account the possible future earnings. Thus the agents are
assumed to be myopic, and repeatedly play a
multi-person game in which all players choose actions
simultaneously in each round.
2.3 Supplier Behavior
We model the supplier as a non-adaptive agent. In each
period, she only does routine works: receives retailer’s
orders, produces enough products and ships them to the
retailers.

400
300
200
100
20000

40000

60000

Figure 4 Time series moving average profits with 5 players
300
200
100

20000

40000

60000

Figure 5 Time series moving average profits with 10 players

100

2.4 Experiment Design
0

We carry out the simulation on the platform of Swarm
developed by Santa Fe Institute. We use the number of
retailers to represent the intensity of the retailers’
competition. We select 5 representative retailer numbers
1, 2, 5, 10, and 20 to carry out the simulation one by one.
For each retailer number, we run the simulation for 5
times. Each time the simulation is run for 8,000 periods
to allow asymptotic behavior to emerge if it is present,
and each time we use different initial action weights of
each agent and different random seeds. Due to the size
limitation of this paper, we will not present the program
code.

-100
20000

40000

60000

Figure 6 Time series moving average profits with 20 players

We can see from the result data that each run shows
asymptotical convergence. When retailer number is the
same, different run converges to the same steady state
and each retailer finally finds the same policy. For
example, in the 2-retailer case, each retailer’s final price
has mean 2.63 with standard derivation 0.05; final order
quantity has mean 399 with standard derivation 18. This
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result seems self-evident due to the homogeneity of the
retailers. But in fact, each retailer has its own individual
decision boxes. It is quite possible that different retailer
converges to different steady states, or even there is no
convergence at all. In this model, each agent’s initial
state is not identical (each action’s initial Q value is
set randomly), and each retailer’s learning process is
also not identical (this is shown in Figure 7, which is an
amplification of Figure 3’s initial part). So the result of
convergences reflects an intrinsic property of the
systems.
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We can conduct “turbulence tests” to see whether the
equilibrium is stable. Suppose when the system arrives
at a steady state, one retailer suddenly loses confidence
on his stationary policies, and wants to explore more
efficient ones. This is implemented by changing the
temperature parameter of softmax selection. We carry
out a turbulence test on a 2-retailer equilibrium, and the
result shows strong stability (see Figure 8).
600
400
200
0

turbulence occurs
20000

40000

60000

80000

Figure 8 Turbulence test on 2-retailer equilibrium

Figure 7 Initial learning dynamics in 2-retailer case

This intrinsic property is that the systems have Nash
equilibria, which can be approximated by these steady
states.
In this model, each agent has two learning automata,
one for retail price and the other for order quantity. We
implement the learning mechanism of each learning
automaton using Q-learning combined with softmax
selection. According to [11], a learning automaton with
this learning mechanism approaches best response
strategy when the temperature parameter (a parameter in
softmax) approaches zero. At steady states, each
learning automaton converges to stationary strategies,
and the temperature parameter becomes small, so each
learning automaton approaches its optimal response.
According to theorems on Nash equilibria, if a game
with multiple players choosing their best responses
converges, it converges to Nash equilibira. Then we
know that all the learning automata are in Nash
equilibria at steady states.

It is notable that during the learning process, each
retailer’s average profit is not always increasing. See
Figure 5, there is a “peak” where all retailers’ profits are
higher than in equilibrium. It seems strange that the
agents do not learn best strategies. This phenomenon is
common in multi-agent learning. Consider the
Prisoners’ Dilemma, each player gets highest payoff
when they cooperate, but it is not Nash equilibrium:
each of them has incentive to betray given the other one
cooperate. The “peak” in Figure 5 stays in the similar
situation: although each retailer gets rather high profits,
he has incentive to change his policy to get even higher
profits. All the retailers are myopic, change policies for
next period’s more profits, but they are finally all worse
off and approach the Nash equilibrium.
The processes of how the system arrives at steady states
are different in different simulation runs. Figure 9 is
another run for 10-retailer simulation, which has no
prominent “peaks” as in Figure 5. But although the
processes of convergence are different, the final states
are always the same.
200
100

20000

40000

60000

80000

Figure 9 Another run for 10-retailer simulation

Each agent consists of two learning automata which
have identical payoffs (because these two learning
automata update their Q values based on the same
agent’s payoff value, see (1)). Then the two learning
automata of each agent also play a cooperative game
with the same aim of making the agent better. So, at
steady states all the learning automata approaches Nash
equilibrium means two things: first, each agent sticks to
stationary price and quantity policies; second, each
agent finds its best combination of price policy and
quantity policy given other agents’ stationary policies.
In other words, at steady states, no agent has incentives
to change its stationary policy, i.e., the agents in the
game approaches Nash equilibria.

The fact that the system approaches Nash equilibrium
does not mean that we are designing particular agents to
find Nash equilibria. All the behavioral assumptions of
the agents in this model are abstractions of real supply
chain partners. We use learning algorithms to imitate the
decision process of a supply chain partner who faces
complex environments and with less information. The
convergence means that in this model retailers will
adopt stationary policies after a long period of learning
and competition. This offers us a basis to investigate
how the retailer price and retailer/ supplier profits are
affected by the competition among the retailers: we will
discuss these issues at steady states.
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We use following Table 3 and Figure 12 to study how
competition affects the retailers.

3.2 Insights
First we investigate how retailer competition affects
retail prices. We get the retail prices at steady states of
each simulation run, and list the data in table 1 and
Figure 10 (These data and all the data in latter tables
and figures are the average of 5 simulation runs, see
section 2.4).

Table 3 Retailer profit under different retailer numbers
Retailer Number

1

2

5

10

20

Total Profit

991

1193

1010

915

806

Single Profit

991

596

202

92

40

Table 1 Retail price under different retailer numbers
Retailer Number
Retail Price

1

2

5

10

20

2.85

2.63

2.14

2.01

1.89

Figure 12 Retailer profit under different retailer numbers
Figure 10 Retail price under different retailer numbers

It can be seen that as retailer number increases (the
competition becomes more intense), the retail price
decreases. So customer benefits from retailers’
competition. This is correspondent with intuition. Yet
we observe that although retail price decreases, it does
not get too low: when there are 20 retailers, retail price
is still 1.88. In other words, the price war is quite mild,
and no fierce lowering-price activity appears. This is
because of the assumptions on agent behaviors:
aspiration on more profits and myopic. Such agents will
not adopt policies that decrease short-time profits to
defeat other agents.
Table 2 and Figure 11 show supplier revenue under
different retailer numbers.
Table 2 Supplier revenue under different retailer
numbers
Retailer Number
Supplier Revenue

1

2

5

10

20

578

800

985

1023

1044

Figure 11 Supplier revenue under different retailer numbers

The supplier’s revenue increases with the number of
retailers, i.e., competition among the agents are
beneficial to the supplier. The reason is as follows:
retailer competition decreases retail price, so customer
demand increases; accordingly, retailers will order more
products from the supplier, and supplier’s wholesale
price is fixed, thus supplier gets more revenue.

Each retailer’s profit decreases with the number of
retailers in the market. In this model, the mean of total
customer demand does not change and all the retailers
share this market. The more the retailers, the smaller
each market share.
Figure 12 also shows that retailers’ total profit is
maximal when there are two retailers and it decreases
when there are more than two retailers. The decrease of
retailers’ total profit can be attributed to the competition
among the retailers. Figure 10 show that retailer
competition can decrease retail price. This has two
effects: (1) decrease retailer profit directly, and (2)
increase customer demand and thus increase retailer
profit. Notice that in this model, each customer has the
choice of not buying. Thus if there are more retailers, a
customer is less likely to leave without buying anything,
i.e., retailers’ total profit increases. This can be viewed
as the benefits of offering customers more selection
options. We denote this effect as (3). General literature
on supply chain management ignores this effect, yet
following we will see that this effect can play an
important role in certain cases. Whether retailers’ total
profit increases or decreases depends on the trade off
between effect (1) (decreases retailers’ total profit) and
effect (2) plus (3) (increase retailers’ total profit). From
Figure 12 we can see when there are more than 2
retailers, the retailers’ total profit decreases, which
implies that effect (1) dominates effect (2) plus (3). Yet
retailers’ total profit is more in 2-retailer case than in
1-retailer case. This is different with general economic
conclusions which believe a monopoly often obtains
maximum market profits. Effect (3) plays an important
role in the difference between this model and classical
economic model, and makes effect (2) plus (3) dominate
in this case.
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we investigate the horizontal competition
in a one-supplier-multiple-retailer supply chain. We
adopt agent-based simulation, which is quite different
with classical methods. Based on the assumptions of the
agents’ behaviors, we endow each agent with a
reasonable learning mechanism. The results show that
the system converges asymptotically to steady states
that approach Nash equilibria. Under these steady states,
we analyze how retailer price and supplier/retailer
profits are affected by the competition among the
price-setting retailers, and notice the important role of
customer choice behavior which is generally ignored in
supply chain research.
This paper also inspires us an in-depth research on the
issues of horizontal cooperation among the retailers.
From former analysis we know that retailers’ total profit
decreases with retailer number. This gives the retailers
strong incentives to collaborate with each other. We will
address this issue in future work.
Furthermore, this paper inspires us to study vertical
competition and cooperation in the supply chain. Here
we get the conclusion that the supplier will benefit from
the competition between the retailers. How things would
be if the supplier can adjust wholesale price? And, when
the supplier knows that retailer competition is beneficial
for her, she will have incentive to prevent the
collaborations among the retailers. So we can
investigate what measures the supplier can take to
prevent such collaborations.
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